cdn.revolutionise.com.au/site/w2evwdgm7fcfgpmj.pdf Interim Report on the capsize of "The Big Hairy"
Thanks for that.
The crew had the following AS qualifications; First Aid Certificates, Keelboat Instructor, National Equipment Auditor (2), Safety and Sea Survival Certificates, past Keel Boat Instructor (expired). The boat had the keel checked according to AS requirements by two different people, one in January 2023 and one in June 2023. The keel fell off and a crewman died. So yet again we see that the qualification and paperwork system is NOT doing its job. In that case why on earth is AS not changing its approach?
They are now recommending "more extensive keel inspections, such as complete removal of the keel, or non-destructive testing methods, as appropriate for the keel construction and attachment method, or use of the yacht, on a longer time period than those structural inspections done on a 24 month period in accordance with Offshore Special Regulations 3.02.2 and 3.02.3." Arguably that ignores the fact that keels on older boats almost never fall off. The number of keel losses is a disgrace but from just about every account it seems to be related to a design issue that WS and AS could easily address. Why keep on trying to paper over the cracks by demanding owners of designs that DON'T lose keels pay for inspections when the problem is restricted to boats with high-aspect bulb keels and even quite new ones owned by pros fail?
The problem arguably isn't the inspections but the basic design. Can anyone name a pre-1984 design that has lost a keel, apart from major groundings that basically destroyed the whole boat? Which one?
All AS and WS can do is to require these boats be checked when they race offshore. Many of them are already out of offshore racing so they are still a hazard - just an uncontrolled one. Why not just put penalties on these keels just as they penalised running backstays, so people accept a minor speed loss and put on safer keels that won't lead to future problems?
cdn.revolutionise.com.au/site/w2evwdgm7fcfgpmj.pdf Interim Report on the capsize of "The Big Hairy"
Thanks for that.
The crew had the following AS qualifications; First Aid Certificates, Keelboat Instructor, National Equipment Auditor (2), Safety and Sea Survival Certificates, past Keel Boat Instructor (expired). The boat had the keel checked according to AS requirements by two different people, one in January 2023 and one in June 2023. The keel fell off and a crewman died. So yet again we see that the qualification and paperwork system is NOT doing its job. In that case why on earth is AS not changing its approach?
They are now recommending "more extensive keel inspections, such as complete removal of the keel, or non-destructive testing methods, as appropriate for the keel construction and attachment method, or use of the yacht, on a longer time period than those structural inspections done on a 24 month period in accordance with Offshore Special Regulations 3.02.2 and 3.02.3." Arguably that ignores the fact that keels on older boats almost never fall off. The number of keel losses is a disgrace but from just about every account it seems to be related to a design issue that WS and AS could easily address. Why keep on trying to paper over the cracks by demanding owners of designs that DON'T lose keels pay for inspections when the problem is restricted to boats with high-aspect bulb keels and even quite new ones owned by pros fail?
The problem arguably isn't the inspections but the basic design. Can anyone name a pre-1984 design that has lost a keel, apart from major groundings that basically destroyed the whole boat? Which one?
All AS and WS can do is to require these boats be checked when they race offshore. Many of them are already out of offshore racing so they are still a hazard - just an uncontrolled one. Why not just put penalties on these keels just as they penalised running backstays, so people accept a minor speed loss and put on safer keels that won't lead to future problems?
I think they both (AS & WS) are convinced the sport of sailing is dependant on ever increasing speed in order to attract participants and grow. They want it to be a product they can sell TV rights to, so they can get more money into the sport to fund their positions.
Therefore slowing boats down is the opposite of the path they want to take. That's my conspiracy theory.
What Chris said is right. Aircraft operate from -20 to +55 degrees C, and with substantial stress on the wings, but the wings dont fall off. It should be possible to make/retest periodically keels that dont all off. If its a known that a keel detaching is a risk factor maybe the hull could have a mechanism to stop it inverting.
What Chris said is right. Aircraft operate from -20 to +55 degrees C, and with substantial stress on the wings, but the wings dont fall off. It should be possible to make/retest periodically keels that dont all off. If its a known that a keel detaching is a risk factor maybe the hull could have a mechanism to stop it inverting.
We have to be honest. The yacht construction industry is sloppy at best. The best best certification standard was the Lloyds register of shipping that required materials to be supplied by people who guaranteed and could show liability insurance from the suppliers. In many cases they had to be certified by Lloyds. In some cases lab testing was required of bolts and steel like duplex that required test certification.
These days with so much fake parts and materials in the supply chain where its well known that criminal syndicates are actively involved in this massive fraud in the supply chain you would have to be very trusting to trust any supplier in the boating market that is not ISO certified or does not have inhouse testing abilities. Without certification, test certification's and lab testing of all keel components there is always going to be issues without this certification regime.
Just go into any bolt store and see how many fake high tensile bolts marked bolts you can buy. You can even go down to the local 2 dollar store and buy fake class 8.8 and even higher bolt like objects! Then who is really going to trust bronze or stainless bolts from places like China without xrays, magnaflux or metal composition analysis. All the IMOCA keel parts are tested to these standards. Its almost amusing that CE certification can be granted to so many mass production boats that never had finite element analysis carried out on their keel and rudder structure's for collisions and stress. All done by empirical rules of thumb and a generalised CE certification regime that sink yachts when they strike underwater objects! Suck and see rules the day.
Right on p3p4p5. In my previous life I had to order the rejection of millions of dollars worth of high pressure valves for an oil terminal, when physical testing revealed that the materials for critical parts were nothing like the specs. Dunno who accepted the dodgy Chinese tender, but we had to go back to the big-name USA and European vendors and actually pay the real price for what we wanted.
If the yacht racing "industry" had to conduct formal risk assessments like we did, rigourous testing would become mandatory. It's funny how we insist on high formalised levels of safety when we work, but seem happy to accept "she'll be right" when we play.
Cheers, Graeme
Very interesting, p3 and Wagonga, and not comforting.
One thing is though that if we insist on IMOCA or other high formalised levels of safety, very few people will be able to play. And what would happen to the ex-players then? Will they sit on the couch and die of heart problems, by far our #1 killer, due to lack of exercise? Will they get into other sports that can have similar safety and QC problems with similar hazards, as cycling may?
There is arguably no really major risk in ocean racing that is costing lives, apart from the boats with high-aspect bulb keels (and perhaps getting MOB back OB). Fix them - for example by simply modifying ORC and IRC rules so that high aspect keels get rated for performance plus a penalty - and the entire sport becomes dramatically safer.
I used to have an article by Alan Andrews (?), the NA who designed the replacement keel for the original keel on the 1960s John Spencer designed ultralight 62'er Ragtime. The keel was a low-aspect bulb that was only being removed for a more efficient design.
First they used managed to remove the keel bolts. Then they sliced the dynel sheathing between keel and hull, and lifted the boat with a crane. No dice. Then they bounced it with the crane. No budging. Then they went out, got some hydraulic wedges, drove them between keel and hull, and lifted the boat off the ground. Nothing doing. Finally they drove them further AND bounced the boat up and down in the air, which finally cracked the epoxy Spencer had poured between the keelson and the top of the keel. It seemed like a classic example that we know we can build tough hull/keel joins and we did so for decades.
It is starting to look like there is a standard and classification issue.
When ABS stopped there was no new classification system to replace it and ISO did not commence for about 6 years.
In the intervening period new keels also become more aggressive with bulb weight.
Generally, it is keels from this design period which are failing.
Interestingly, the AS report does not say who did the second sign off just a second keel was made.
Seems to be a key piece of information.
There is a real failure with these reports as AS has no powers of compulsion of witnesses.
AS should get serious and say failure to co operate is a RRS 69.
Is that a Davidson?
Dubois half tonner Madmen's Woodyard. A light boat for her time, built in timber, and yet able to withstand a week aground. Arguably it's yet another example of the fact that keel aspect ratio/root area is critical, and that if you build boats with a decent root area they stay on.
It's not irrelevant that our rival when we were sailing her in the '80s was Planet X, one of the first boats in Australia with a "MME" keel with a very heavily curved aft profile, like the one below, which gave it a small root area compared to the normal keel.
Although the MME keel didn't have the extra leverage problems of extreme depth or a bulb as found in today's boats, Planet X still lost her first MME keel when the boat was new, arguably because the keel root area was too small which caused excessive loads on the hull/keel joint. Contrast that to the durability that the Woodyard - a boat of similar age, size and speed - has shown with a conventional keel of similar weight, average chord and depth but with a normal profile giving it a larger root area.
Very interesting, p3 and Wagonga, and not comforting.
One thing is though that if we insist on IMOCA or other high formalised levels of safety, very few people will be able to play. And what would happen to the ex-players then? Will they sit on the couch and die of heart problems, by far our #1 killer, due to lack of exercise? Will they get into other sports that can have similar safety and QC problems with similar hazards, as cycling may?
There is arguably no really major risk in ocean racing that is costing lives, apart from the boats with high-aspect bulb keels (and perhaps getting MOB back OB). Fix them - for example by simply modifying ORC and IRC rules so that high aspect keels get rated for performance plus a penalty - and the entire sport becomes dramatically safer.
I used to have an article by Alan Andrews (?), the NA who designed the replacement keel for the original keel on the 1960s John Spencer designed ultralight 62'er Ragtime. The keel was a low-aspect bulb that was only being removed for a more efficient design.
First they used managed to remove the keel bolts. Then they sliced the dynel sheathing between keel and hull, and lifted the boat with a crane. No dice. Then they bounced it with the crane. No budging. Then they went out, got some hydraulic wedges, drove them between keel and hull, and lifted the boat off the ground. Nothing doing. Finally they drove them further AND bounced the boat up and down in the air, which finally cracked the epoxy Spencer had poured between the keelson and the top of the keel. It seemed like a classic example that we know we can build tough hull/keel joins and we did so for decades.
Why don't they just implement the performance penalty you suggest. Seems like the simplest and cheapest solution for all.